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Abstract
It has been shown at other occasions [1] that recent results of modern physics
can be used to shed some more light onto the foundations of the world, provided
the actual task of philosophy is being re-interpreted in terms of a theory which is
following up the results of science rather than laying the grounds for the latter,
contrary to what the original intention of Aristotelian prima philosophia would
imply. As it turns out, the interpretation of the main results of present research
dealing with aspects of quantum information theory and quantum gravity, re-
spectively, as well as with self-organized criticality, suffices to re-construct a
large class of phenomena not only within the field of physics proper, but also
within chemistry, biology, and even the social sciences. As seen under a philo-
sophical perspective, it can be shown that the general conceptualization of such
a unified view of the world has been prepared on a long line of thought which
begins with the Greek Stoá and leads up to the theories of Spinoza, Schelling
and Bloch as some of its representatives, eventually showing up in a somewhat
modified form in what can be called transcendental materialism today. [2] As
seen under the physical perspective however, it can be demonstrated how a phi-
losophy re-interpreted in the above-mentioned sense can unfold a heuristic po-
tential which is able to produce guidelines of orientation as to deciding about
competing concepts in physics. [3] On the other hand, such a philosophy can
also hint towards what science cannot deal with at all, pointing to what is
beyond the scientifically treatable. We show that questions of ultimate reality
and meaning can only be answered within a framework of speculative philoso-
phy which is rooted though in what sceptic philosophy is able to derive from
scientific results. Hence, cataleptic phantasy is what is asked for, but this is not
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an arbitrary technique of imagination, but rather something whose nucleus is
that sort of logic which itself is being produced by the underlying physics.
1 Philosophy & Science
Nothing is more difficult to mediate than the totality of mediation itself. Namely
that which is encompassing and expressing the worldly (welthaft) existing as a
unity which in turn implies that there is only one world for us in one piece (a
holistic world that is) of which humans and all what they perceive, is a part. To
be more precise: It is a produced fragment which is producing and re-producing
itself all the time. All this despite the phenomenological variety of what can be
concretely found within worldly (welthafter) praxis which appears to us very
often as an irritating, disparate manifold of an amazing richness of form. In this
sense, everything is indeed related to everything else: the physical foundations
of the cosmology of our Universe to biological evolution, the mathematical mo-
delling of the world to the aesthetical forms of expression in the arts, as well as
the everyday life within the social process to the formation of structure within
non-living nature. However, to merely accept this fact (which is difficult enough
for its own part) means nothing but to support a somewhat tautological, if not
even trivial, insight. What we need instead is the explicit derivation of the one
from the other, i.e., a methodologically consistent, systematic illumination of the
totality which establishes the interrelationships among all these different per-
spectives of the world which are themselves produced by the manifold of rese-
arch fields – in turn showing up itself as a relationship between derivation and
mediation at the same time.
Basically, it is only philosophy which uses a suitable language adequate to the-
matize this complex fact. This is so because the sciences (being primarily single
sciences aiming at a unique field of research) are restricted qua definitione to a
specific section of this totality. This is also true for aesthetics as the theory of the
arts. On the other hand, the common language of everyday life (which indeed
aims towards that totality) is by far too unclear and unprecise so that it is not
able to open relevant insight into the worldly (welthafte) totality. What we need
therefore, is a language which is situated somehow „within the middle“ of all of
these, and it is philosophy only which can offer such a language. This is mainly
so because philosophy can be visualized as a „science of totality“ from the out-
set (as Hans Heinz Holz has formulated a long while ago).
Unfortunately, this fact has been forgotten for long as far as main line philoso-
phy is being concerned. In particular, the more recent philosophy of the 20th
century, after world war II, has more or less completely suppressed the line of
thinking which is mainly based on this fact, essentially in favour of a self-
centring discussion of philosophy itself, taking its label for its contents. This is
due to the neo-Kantian effort dating back to the 19th century, to eventually esta-
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blish a new, formal unity of the sciences, philosophy, the arts, and religion. Al-
though this mainly apologetic enterprise has been subject to failure from the be-
ginning on, it is nevertheless determining European (and in particular German)
philosophy still today by its two basic components of activities: the history of
philosophy on the one hand and the foundations of concepts on the other. Con-
crete praxis then, shows up only in terms of a developmental history of thinking,
divorced from any practical relationship to worldly (welthafte) and also empiri-
cal existence – being enshrined in a kind of „pure motion of thoughts“ which has
lost already sight of the world of everyday life, of the socially mediated and po-
litically active human being. Hence, the history of philosophy is very often
mixed up with philosophy proper, the practise of doing history with actual phi-
losophizing. And concentrating on the motion of thoughts means to actually for-
get about what these thoughts actually do reflect at all – thinking all the time,
uncorrectly though, that the latter would not be important, once the mechanism
of relexion itself would have been uncovered. This view is also supported,
though from another perspective, by analytic philosophy which dominates the
Anglo-Saxon region of languages. Here also, the systematization of thinking is
more important than that about which thinking actually thinks. Moreover, it is
assumed, also uncorrectly, that what is being thought can always be said, thus
denying the unconscious and the necessity for any hermeneutic which is surpas-
sing formal logic.
This is how philosophy leaves not only the conception of critically reflecting
praxis, but is also leaving itself, because the former basically expresses the lat-
ter’s nucleus of activity. It is not very astonishing therefore, that more and more
often, philosophers are not able to contribute anything new to ongoing discussi-
ons of public life, not because they would not have available the appropriate in-
ventory of concepts, but rather because they would not even recognize the pro-
blematic relevance of all these aspects of practical life. At the same time, this
ideological tendency serves also a much more personal interest, namely one
which aims at the securing of an isolated field of discourse which is exclusively
reserved for the philosophical discourse alone. This has become very obvious in
the recently emerged field of „cognitive science“, where each explicitly mate-
rialistic model is being rejected from the outset by this „philosophical lobby“,
based on the false premise of indicating that this would be nothing than late re-
lics of the mechanical materialism of the 19th century, and a primarily reductio-
nistic effort with the objective of eventually taking over philosophy in merely
scientific terms. However, keeping to this false premise means to forget about
the fact that a philosophy which can be understood in terms of a dialectical and
transcendental materialism visualized within a modern perspective is nothing
but the result of critically reflecting recently gained insight in the various fields
of science. In other words: only such an approach can be called practical in the
first place. However, in order to really understand this idea, it is necessary to
agree to two premises which so far have not been part of philosophical
reasoning very frequently: 1) philosophy has to be understood as one which is
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dealing with the critical reflexion of what can be found within the world, and it
is following up therefore the results of science rather than laying the grounds for
them, 2) philosophy has to be understood as one which is orienting itself accor-
ding to what science has found out about the world, in the first place, due to the
actual horizon of knowledge of a given epoch. This is so because the sciences
are „in charge“ of the single sectors of worldly (welthaften) actuality, philoso-
phy however, is „in charge“ of the totality of all these sectors. Hence, in being
oriented with a view to the sciences, philosophy is not at all duplicating the lat-
ter’s work. Contrary to that, philosophizing means primarily to critically reflect
each single sector of the uncovered worldly (Welthaften) with a view to the glo-
bal interrelationships among all possible sectors, to ask for necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for the main structural aspects of single sectors, and for possible
alternatives. In this sense, philosophical reflexion gains more and more a heuri-
stic connotation: The unification of the scientifically (necessary) segmented ac-
tuality is no self-purpose therefore (not a l’Art pour l’Art), in very much the sa-
me way as the arts are never self-purpose: On the contrary, the important point
is to show, within all what is empirically observable, what is not more subject of
science, as Theunissen has argued.
Only if philosophy is actually being visualized under this new perspective, will
it be able to offer relevant insight and guidelines for an ethically adequate beha-
viour within the worldly (welthaften) praxis we do observe. Obviously, this
viewpoint secures the relevance of what is going on in the sciences at the present
time. There is no question of eventually falling back to 19th century knowledge.
Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that the line of thinking on which we have
based here this new viewpoint as one of its results, originates in the thinking of
the German idealistic philosophers (especially the Tübingen group: Hölderlin,
Schelling, Hegel), but also in the thinking of Feuerbach and Marx. The re-
construction of this line which in turn is based itself on earlier roots at least da-
ting back as far as to Spinoza, has been topic then, in its modern version within
20th century philosophy, in the conceptions of Bloch and Sartre, both different,
but nevertheless also very similar in their detailed structure, being able in turn to
give for us a relevant frame of orientation for a future philosophy still to come.
It is the objective of this present paper to stress this point.
Hence, the important aspect is not to get rid of the historic genesis of thinking,
and we can still learn from our predecessors. However, we cannot stop at this
historical sight. We have to ask further: What shall we do with it? Namely given
what is our present knowledge at the time. In this sense, ethics is essentially
knowledge as I have formulated at an earlier occasion. [4] If this is the case, then
we have to start with the knowledge. However, knowledge is always a mediated,
communicated and communicable, thus linguistically expressable one. Hence, in
order to arrive at the goal of a philosophy which can be visualized as one which
is „charged“ with heuristic potential, and which can give a feedback to the sci-
ences again, after having critically reflected what is being known at a given
epoch, we have to clarify three basic aspects: 1) the detailed nature of the afo-
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rementioned mediating totality, 2) the re-construction of a new concept of pra-
xis, 3) the illumination of the relationship between this new concept of praxis
and a similarly adequate concept of theory.
In the following we discuss these three aspects in terms of an example dealing
with the fundamental categories which determine human thinking decisively
from the beginning on: space and time. We will understand that it is physics it-
self which „pre-defines“ these concepts which for us, are common everyday
concepts at the same time, and which structures them in mathematical terms.
However, in doing so, physics also demonstrates that these concepts turn out to
be genetically produced concepts, and hence they cannot be fundamental. What
we have to accept therefore, in order to dissolve this apparent contradiction, is
that space and time are nothing but complex compositions of signs with which
we characterize central aspects of the world we perceive, for giving a fixed basis
to our own orientation. In this sense, these concepts underly a principle of selec-
tion which is very similar to the respective principle we use in biology. In other
words: Humans show up as biologically produced entities whose mode of being
is thinking, but who are also able to reproduce and produce aspects of their
world (and themselves). Hence, we can think of humans as a produced mode of
production. And it is this mode of production which is determining human expe-
rience decisively.
2 The Logic of Space and Time
There is hardly anything which would be more familiar to human beings than
the characterization of the world in terms of the fundamental categories of space
and time. It is time which fills the space of everyday life with meaning (to quote
Bachtin) and nothing determines our everyday life more completely than (artifi-
cially defined) clock time. Concepts which are derived from this conceptualiza-
tion of the world in terms of space-time determine themselves the structure of
human language. Hence, communication itself is conceptually constituted in
terms of space-time structure. A large class of languages incorporates a charac-
teristic dichotomy of pairwise ordered concepts which model motion (including
evolution) as a composition of changes per time distance. This dichotomy is also
mapped onto the polar relationship of noun and verb which symbolically repre-
sents the contradiction between rest and motion. In fact, it is the grammar of the
stoician Zeno dominating the whole European space of languages until today
that has originally emerged from a detailed philosophizing about the relationship
between space and time. Usually, the categories of space and time are being
„corporalized“ as a kind of container in which worldly (welthafte) processuality
is visualized of being happening. Space and time provide a kind of „stage“ on
which the world takes place. World as theatre, as stage of life, as comedy is a
collection of established literary topoi. In Kantian terms, space and time are the
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forms of conception (Anschauungsformen) under which the world is being taken
into sight.
What is it then that we call world, and how can we apply these categories of
space and time to this world? Basically, the world is visualized as the set of all
that has been perceived – despite the fact that soon somewhat interpolated and
extrapolated extensions creep into this conception, rarely noticed in everyday
context, mainly due to the fact that we do not only cognitively process what we
have perceived, but that we also communicate it all the time. Indeed: We can
process the perceived at all, just because we have acquired a certain expectatio-
nal intention (or anticipation) produced by our communicating in the first place.
From our first days on we acquire techniques of an inventory which is there at
hand for us. Socialization is mainly the learning of utilizing these techniques.
However, once we would like to find a foundation for them, we have to draw
from a lore which is present in our experience, an experience which is subject to
the same subjective socialization so that our actions within daily life are based
on a reflexion which can at most offer preliminary results. Actions (which al-
ways display behaviour towards Others and the environment) are limited there-
fore in their practical scope, effectivity and adequacy (in short: in their compe-
tence). Hence, a picture of the world which is primarily constituted from this
somewhat incomplete information about the world is hardly able to provide us
with guidelines for a really adequate behaviour (what ethics should actually do).
What we can do at most is to find a moral consensus which refers us to a frame
of reference as to what adequate behaviour could be. This frame of reference
however cannot be otherwise than incomplete and therefore false. From there it
is a long way to a reasonable ethics.
The basic reason for this divergence from what is aimed at is perception itself:
This is obviously restricted from the beginning on such that primary perception
(produced by the biological data of the sensoric input) is always fragmentary. So
in optical terms we can only perceive a tiny section of the electromagnetic
spectrum which we call light. Different sections (ultra-violet, ultra-red and
gamma radiation) we can perceive at most as damage or in terms of organic de-
fects, and they do not serve as controllable means of orientation. Similarly tiny
is the acoustic section we perceive with our ears. And if we compare the optical
and acoustic perceptions with the others (smelling, tasting, touching), they ap-
pear as background sensory perceptions rather than equal means of grasping the
world. Hence, if we perceive only a tiny fraction of what there actually is, why
should it be surprising at all that we have hardly access to our world as it is re-
ally there? Of course, measuring devices can help us to extend our means of
perception. But this perception is not immediate, but mediated at best; it is se-
condary perception.
What we recognize is that humans gain their access to the world only in terms of
mapping sensoric input to their brain. Instead of dealing with the „real thing“
directly, humans achieve their access only by a two-step transformation of what
there actually is: by a first step of transforming what there is into sensoric input
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data, by a second step of translating the incoming information to data which can
be interpreted (determined by what is saved in the brain and is usually called
experience). But even worse: The successive registration of input data is not
even synchronous with the „picture“ which is being composed then as interpre-
tation of these data. This is because the brain releases a given information only
when all data have arrived which correspond to that information. As we can cle-
arly understand, the time data need to arrive at the appropriate brain section is
different according to their nature: Obviously, optical data have to choose
another lane for being transported to the brain than acoustic data have. The brain
collects them into a single time window (of milliseconds). If this window is clo-
sed in the end, the brain presents us the corresponding information as a picture
or a series of pictures similar to a movie. Strictly seen, we can say that the brain
„composes“ a movie representing the incoming information and „plays“ it to us.
The movie director is partially the biological „hardware“ which fixes the causal
frame of perception, partially the already saved „software“ (which in turn con-
sists of the internal „programmes“ steering the brain itself, and of information
acquired and composed in the past called experience).
Do not worry about our describing these aspects in terms of computer language.
In fact, what we have done so far is not only to give a description of what is
known about perception today, but we have also demonstrated that descriptions
themselves, that is namings and connections between namings, can only be
thought in terms of metaphorizations. Only a consensually accepted metaphor is
able to express something which generates maximal understanding. And because
many people deal by now with both movies and computers, it is very likely that
metaphors from that domain, though obviously time-dependent as they are, can
improve the understanding of the concepts underlying the ongoing discussion. In
other words: Nobody would have been able to deal with the metaphors chosen
here some hundred-fifty years ago. But because today, we visualize conscious-
ness in terms of an information processing system, we can use a computer meta-
phor, because for us today, the computer is the leading paradigm. But this does
not tell us how things really are, what we simply do is to model them according
to our present leading paradigms which serve as foundations of communication.
Hence, never is what we call world directly accessible to us. Everything is al-
ways mediated by a mapping procedure. In other words: According to what we
perceive do we model the world and produce a picture of the world. In fact, we
produce our world by means of this mapping procedure. (But note that the
procedure we use is itself an outcome of the process we try to model!)
In philosophical terms, nevertheless, we assume the realistic viewpoint: We as-
sume that exterior to our thinking and independent of ourselves there actually is
something. But how what there is actually is in truth, we cannot find out at all.
Because only a tiny fraction of what there is can be perceived. Hence, we can
decide: either we call what we can model according to our cognitively processed
perception our world. Then what exists really is exterior to our world, in parti-
cular beyond space, time and matter. Then we have a multitude of worlds, to
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assume anything else would be unjustifiable anthropomorphism. – Or, we call
what there is outside, the world. Then our world is nothing but a mediated parti-
al aspect of the totality which is this world. Hence, mediation is due then to the
biological characteristica of humans. Again, there is a multitude of perspectives
then under which the world can be taken into sight. Both cases have in common
that there is one region about which we can know something, and another region
about which we cannot know anything. And in both cases what we call „funda-
mental categories“ is not really fundamental.
To philosophize about the one region is subject to sceptic philosophy, about the
other is subject to speculative philosophy. But speculation does not mean arbi-
trary imagination: On the contrary, speculation is restricted with a view to the
framework which is prescribed in terms of the sceptic approach reflecting what
we already know about the world. That is to say, whatever speculation we choo-
se, we have to arrive at least at the results of knowledge obtained about our
world as far as it is accessible in empirical terms. This is a minimal compatibi-
lity condition we have to satisfy in any case. Even more: Although what we call
fundamental categories turns out to be more than questionable, whatever model
we actually choose, we have to end up with the result that what we do perceive
must be compatible with what we cannot perceive, because as part or aspect of
totality we always remain part or aspect of totality.
And this confronts us with another problem: If we accept the aforementioned we
have to differ in future between two perspectives or two levels of description.
What we can know and what falls therefore into the domain of sceptical philo-
sophy, can be expressed in terms of language, in particular in terms of propositi-
ons. As we have seen already, language itself is structured in spatial and tempo-
ral terms, and reflects therefore the fundamental categories which serve as fra-
mework for our thinking. This is different however in the case of the second (in
principle more fundamental) perspective: In that case we have to deal with a re-
gion which is not itself constituted in spatial and temporal terms. Nevertheless,
for its description we have to use the same language which is based on the fun-
damental categories which „have nothing to say“ about this region. Obviously,
this must be very difficult. But we recognize now the advantage of our language
being constituted such as to act basically by means of metaphors: only then do
we have a possibility at all to signify things which lie outside our inventory of
signs. Despite of this we can at least approximate meanings which might even-
tually gain practical relevance.
The consequences are obvious: Scientific modelling relies always on the scepti-
cal aspect. In terms of a spatio-temporal perspective it is not difficult therefore,
to talk about „evolution“. We can state the following: Humans are biological
entities which have emerged from the evolutive differentiation of structures
within the interplay of selection and mutation on this very planet. However, as
can be clearly recognized, this is only true according to the sceptical perspective.
Because, according to the speculative perspective, there is no evolution, because
there is no spatio-temporal processuality. In other words: Human consciousness
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is structured in such a way that its modelling leads to reasonable results, provi-
ded we model them according to the fundamental categories of space and time.
This enterprise is nothing but practical. In this sense, a speculative foundation of
the same model is rather unpractical. But it is the only way to eventually achie-
ve something like a „true“ foundation. Because, as Schelling already knew, the
foundation of something is always outside of what it is foundation to: „ ... foun-
dation is against that to which it is foundation, non-being.“ [5] Hence, the first
form of foundation is nothing but the regression onto the origin: Everything
which actually is, can at best be reduced to its beginning. (Schelling called this
„mechanism“.) This foundation however is that of praxis. The second form
makes possible to derive what is out of its foundation. The possible is being un-
folded by going progressively forward to what there has become. (Schelling
called this „organism“.) Both these movements are not identical: The regressive
component displays what there actually has become, the progressive component
displays what there could have become. The philosophical insight into the foun-
dation of totality is based exactly on that discrepancy between the two move-
ments. In this sense, foundation means to uncover possibility and actuality, to
construct the boundary between them, and to talk about their mutual relations-
hip. We note two basic results: First of all, the foundation of being is not not-
hing(ness), but it is something; it is what is not, but can be. It is possibility. Not-
hing(ness) however is what is not, but also cannot be. It is the impossible. If so-
mething has become actual, then it must have been possible in the first place.
The inverse is not true. [6] (And hence, there cannot be a creatio ex nihilo.) On
the other hand, this is rather a methodological insight, speculative philosophy
goes onto progression. (Schelling called it „positive“.) Sceptical philosophy
goes onto regression. (Schelling called it „negative“.) In manifold variations this
contradiction is always intrinsic and shows up as contradiction between synthe-
sis and analysis, and between deduction and induction. (At the time of Schelling,
people referred to the contradiction between rationalism and empiricism. [7] )
But note: Philosophy cannot stay with this contradiction alone. Because every
methodological dualism is itself perspectively determined. In reality, regression
is always limited from the outset, because it is sceptical. And although the scep-
tical perspective refers back to the speculative one, as to its „natural“ contradic-
tion, this contradiction itself is somewhat artificial again, because it is actually
being produced by the restriction in terms of perspectives in the first place.
Strictly spoken, this contradiction is itself negative. Consequently, Schelling
tried to derive a „true principle of being“ which he called potentia ultima. This
potential was thought as indicator for a „reality before all possibility“. [8] He
attempted this approach by means of a basically idealistic philosophy. Ne-
vertheless, his merit is mainly to visualize the problem in systematic terms from
the beginning on such that method and system fall into one. Although Schelling
falls back behind Spinoza who aims at existence rather than at essence, and also
introduces important materialistic connotations into his philosophy (because for
the latter, the attribute of substance, is in the end space itself), he recognizes the
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organicity of systems: „The system must have a principle which is constituted in
itself and by itself, which reproduces itself in every part of the whole; it must be
organic: one must be determined by all, and all by one: it must not exclude
anything, not unilaterally subordinate or even suppress anything.“ [9] In this
formulation, Schelling expresses as early as 1810 what today turns out to be a
central aspect within the context of modern research: reproduction. If the whole
system reproduces itself, then its subsystems are being produced. However we
recognize the critical point here: Reproduction can remain static and is not au-
tomatically referred to a concept of motion or of dynamical process. Production,
on the contrary, points always to a dynamical activity, because something acts
upon something else. Hence, self-reproduction can be visualized as permanent,
instrinsically resting, processing of itself by itself. But production asks for histo-
ry. It asks for spatio-temporal constitution.
Hence, we are back to perspectivity: The excellence of Spinoza’s approach is in
the constitution of the attribute (which is essentially one). The attribute of exten-
sion (res extensa) has to be visualized as a whole which acts onto itself by self-
diffentiating into parts. It is not constituted by parts. [10] Also, for Spinoza, it is
only the imagination which goes onto parts. In reality, matter is only one. Its
partition can only be observed modaliter, but not realiter. Space is the principle
of matter as principle of order. But space is not really there: it permanently
processes itself. In so far it satisfies Schelling’s organicity condition. And what
Spinoza calls attribute, Schelling would call system. The world as it is under-
stood in terms of a system, this is nature as worldly (welthafte) totality. If we
take both of them, Spinoza and Schelling, together, we recognize as the prin-
ciple of the self-organizing worldly (welthaften) being producing space which
reproduces itself in producing its parts.
3   The Physics of Logic
Now what about the viewpoint of physics which is the appropriate science „in
charge“ of the problems discussed here? It is surprising to note that modern
scientific research is dealing with not less than five aspects of what we have
discussed so far: 1) with the relationship between substance and attribute (if we
stay with the Spinozist terminology for a while), 2) with the onto-epistemic me-
diation of what there is with what there is being known, 3) with a universal prin-
ciple of selection governing the unfolding of structures in nature, 4) with the
detailed ordering of a hierarchically structured derivation of the evolution pro-
per, 5) with the methodological transition from logic to hermeneutic. I have
discussed technical details of this at other places (see the above references). We
simply concentrate here on the essential results and ask what they actually do
mean with respect to the problems discussed here.
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The main problem of physics today is the fact that apparently, physics takes
place in two disjoint domains (or worlds) each of which claim to represent the
one and only world: On the one hand, we have Einstein’s theory of relativity,
describing macroscopically a world which can be visualized as space-time, i.e.,
a four-dimensional space with a metric (an invariant measure of distance bet-
ween points) and a specific signature of this metric (meaning that the sign of the
temporal coordinate is different from the other signs). – On the other hand, we
have quantum theory, describing microscopically a space which is not really a
space of concrete observables, but an abstract state space (Hilbert space) which
essentially describes the set of all possible states of a physical system. This
space has a large number of dimensions (interesting cases are actually infinite-
dimensional), and its signature does not indicate any sign differences. In other
words: two completely different descriptions of one and the same world. John
Baez has recently called this a „deeply schizophrenic world view of physics“.
[11] Hence, relatively early, the idea of „pre-geometry“: If we are not able to
unify both these disjoint theories within the world, it might be possible to do so
outside the world. So the basic idea was to introduce an abstract mathematical
structure from which it would be possible to actually derive space and time (and
matter), the contradiction between relativity and quantum theory included. First
approaches are connected with the names of John Wheeler, Roger Penrose, and
Stephen Hawking. Today, this attempt is dominated by two competing theories:
the theory of superstrings (or M theory recently) and the theory of loops. The
former visualizes the elementary buildings blocs of the world on the fundamen-
tal level as string-like entities which vibrate in various oscillating modes (howe-
ver in a space of up to eleven dimensions) whose oscillations produce „tones“
(similar to a violine) representing elementary particles. The latter is not so diffe-
rent in starting from microscopic loops which essentially describe tiny inherent
curvatures and can be visualized as knotted strings. There is convergence, but
both of these theories have their disadvantages: The string people suffer, becau-
se they have to start from a background space which is very similar to that of
special relativity theory – although their theory shall derive space and time in
the first place! The loop people suffer, because the technical difficulties of their
theory make it unlikely to achieve many empirical confirmations very quickly.
They can correctly claim however, that they start from a purely combinatorial
structure without any reference to space or time (which is very much in the sen-
se of Einstein’s basic idea).
At the end of the sixties (of the last century) Roger Penrose has proposed a sort
of derivation which now, thirty years later, turns out to be of relevance for the
loop theory. As „skeleton“ of the world he chooses an abstract network whose
„knots“ have the property of spin (individual angular momentum) only. They
permanently exchange spin according to the conservation of angular momentum.
Hence, this spin network is a fluctuating web which expresses nothing but this
permanent exchange of spin numbers among knots. It is purely combinatorial
and thus underlies the observable space. In fact, physical space can be thought
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of as superposition or „condensation“ of many „layers“ of this network. There
is, together with the spin network, a dual web consisting of a triangulation, a
covering of the network by triangles such that their centre of mass is identical
with one of the network’s knots. This can be visualized as minimal quantization
of space in the following sense: Because the covering de-composes „proto-
space“ into elementary portions described by the length of the triangle sides, one
can define an intrinsic quantization of space volume and space surface which
corresponds to the configuration of spin numbers. Hence, re-arrangements of
spin numbers cause re-arrangements of quantizations; only the duality relation
remains conserved. This describes the microscopic domain.
On the macroscopic domain which is the observable level of the (classical) phy-
sical world, we have the processes whose dynamics represents the formation of
structure (i.e. the production of new structures). Under the perspective of a clas-
sical, macroscopic observer, formation of structure means basically change of
space topology. The phenomenological space is three-dimensional. It can be un-
derstood as the boundary of four-dimensional space-time. Hence, a change in
the components of this space implies a change of its boundary. In mathematical
terms, the formation of structure in this sense, is a mapping from an old space
configuration to a new one. Such mappings are called cobordisms, because they
map spaces onto each other which are cobordant.3 The important point is that
cobordisms as describing a change of structure are not themselves functions, but
spaces! Which has the following consequence: A cobordism describes the tem-
poral change of a space topology which is expressed in terms of the complete
space-time, not only by the time coordinate, as is the usual case for classical
physics. Hence, time shows up here as a quotient of change which is being inte-
grated into the form of space itself and which is not separable from it. The
reason for humans nevertheless „observing“ time as being separated from space
is simply that we are obliged to perceive everything in a sequential manner (one
after the other). We cannot perceive everything at the same time. Hence the old
proverb: that time is what prevents everything from happening all at once. We
can read this as a direct confirmation of the fact that time turns out to be a hu-
man property of perception, but nothing that would be „really“ there indepen-
dent of humans.
We note two important consequences: On the one hand, it can be shown that
there is an explicit correspondence between each three-dimensional space com-
ponent and a Hilbert space such that for each cobordism on the macroscopic
level we have a microscopic change of state. On the other hand, cobordisms sa-
tisfy axioms of (mathematical) categories. They are essentially sets of objects
and mappings among objects (morphisms) which obey two axioms (of the exi-
stence of identities and compositions). A fundamental category in physics is that
of Hilbert spaces (Hilb) whose objects are the spaces themselves, whose mor-
phisms are linear operators among them. In this sense, objects of the category of
                                                          
3 As the name implies, two spaces are said to be cobordant, if there is another space of one dimension more such
that its boundary is the disjoint union of the other two spaces.
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cobordisms (nCob) are (n-1)-dimensional spaces, the morphisms among them
are n-dimensional cobordisms. Mappings among categories are called „func-
tors“. They map objects to objects and morphisms to morphisms.
Because it is primarily the morphisms that determine the characteristics of a ca-
tegory, the theory of categories is mainly one which deals with relationships and
interactions among objects and morphisms rather than with constitutive parts or
elements in the fashion of set theory. Hence, as higher-dimensional analoga to
sets, categories have their specific meaning for the evolutionary aspects of phy-
sics. The central point here is that a theory of everything (TOE) like quantum
gravity shows up as a functor itself. This functor is the aforementioned mapping
which represents the correspondence between the categories nCob and Hilb. It
completely expresses the form of the theory and its contents.
It is comparatively easy now to recognize the basic insight of this referring us
back to the original five points under discussion: The actual relationship bet-
ween the fundamental level of physics and the classical level of physical phe-
nomenology can be visualized as a formal analogue of the relationship between
substance and attribute. The concrete world of daily perceptions shows up as a
perspective restriction of the real world on the fundamental level. In particular,
the formerly „fundamental“ categories of space and time are uncovered as being
derived categories instead. On the other hand, the representation of the theory
and of what the theory itself represents turn out to be one and the same. In this
sense, we can speak of „onto-epistemic“ mediation (according to a concept in-
troduced by Sandkühler). If the theory is the functor by which it is represented
symbolically, then there is a systematic parallelism between thinking and what
thinking is thinking about. This can be easily compared with the conception of
Spinoza.4 Even more: The mediation of the fundamental and classical levels of
physics underlies itself the correspondence-producing action of the theory-
functor. Hence, we can assume that there is a unique principle which universally
steers the production of correspondences. Recently, several ideas have been pre-
sented in order to locate such a universal principle. [13]
Obviously, the problem of finding an adequate translation of abstract fluctua-
tions in a spin network on the fundamental level into phenomenological
processes which can be observed in the world is nothing else than the problem
of finding a translation of the level of substance into the level of attribute. The
actual foundation of our world is at stake. But there is one more point to note:
Basically, logic itself can be represented by algebraic structures such that the
explicit semantics implied by this logic is expressible in algebraic terms. The
axiomatic structure of a category is nothing but such an algebraic structure.
Hence, each category represents a concrete process, represents at the same time
the mapping (representation) of this process and uncovers the logical structure
of this representation. This threefold function of a (mathematical) category secu-
res the consistency of the aforementioned fact that the theory is the functor. Part
                                                          
4 Ethics 2p7: „Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum.“ [12]
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of the axiomatic underlying the category is the composition rule: If A, B and C
are objects of a category, and f, g, h are morphisms of the form
f: A → B, g: B → C, h: A → C,
then we shall have for the composition of the first two: g o f = h. Now note the
following: The objects can actually mean complete languages (sets of objects =
words and morphisms = correspondences which follow a given axiomatic
structure = their logic = grammar). Assume that A stands for German, and B for
English, and C for French (so that the chosen category is that of all possible lan-
guages). Then we clearly recognize here a crucial difference as compared to
formal languages (such as mathematics): While in the case of the latter, transla-
tions must be always complete (so that the composition rule is strictly satisfied),
in the case of the former, this is not possible. A German text which is translated
into English first, and then into French will usually be different from a German
text which is translated directly into French. In other words: g o f ≠ h. Why is
that? Because, in general, a translation between logics is always „exhausting“ or
not possible at all (null). The underlying axiomatic structure guarantees consi-
stency. (Extraterrestric humans, if we meet them one day, would always be able
to translate our mathematical representations into their (mathematical) language.
Conversely, we would always be able to comprehend what they mean when tal-
king about mathematics. Otherwise we would not have met them in the first
place.) Not so in the case of everyday language: Contrary to formal languages, it
has the task to map everything what there is, independent of strict, logical requi-
rements. But why is it that we cannot express what is beyond logic in adequate
terms? Because we lack the necessary information: There are many things which
cannot be forged into any closed, consistent, propositional form. Hence, we can
never completely know what is meant with what is said. What we actually mean
depends on the individual context, and this is mainly a result of a singular socia-
lization. (Hence, the real problem as to these extraterrestric people would be to
find out something about their emotions which determines their mentality deci-
sively – and our political behaviour.) In the case of everyday language not logic
is at stake, but hermeneutic. This is not an art of knowing, but rather an art of
guessing. (This does not mean that the latter would not have to rely on the for-
mer.) So logic is for hermeneutic the necessary, but not sufficient condition of
understanding. Hence, hermeneutic can be visualized as generalization of logic
by incomplete information. Logic turns out to be a special case of hermeneutic:
It is valid, if translations are path-independent (in the sense of category theory).
In general and complex situations however translations are path-dependent.
So we notice a surprising fact: that crucial aspects of the problems intuitively
discussed before with a view to philosophical argumentation are already for a
long time subject of scientific research. Only the language utilized and the ob-
jectives defined by the respective research are different. Looking more closely
reveals however that this is not very surprising indeed, given the assumption we
28.05.01   18:09   R E Zimmermann: URAM 11/2001 15
mentioned before: that humans are part of nature, a producing product of nature,
to be more presise.
Preliminary Conclusions
Coming back to our computer metaphor: The recent (and very successful) movie
Matrix [14] has illustrated another aspect of what we have discussed so far. The
movie describes a future in which humans are being exploited by intelligent ma-
chines which deceive them by an artificial world (whose software is called ma-
trix) in order to controll them. The problem of the protagonists (a small group of
humans who was able to „de-couple“ from the matrix) is to find a way of influ-
encing (that is: re-programming) the matrix software. We will not discuss the
various inconsistencies of the movie’s plot here or the celebrated action scenes.
(In fact, the movie is nothing but a recent version of an old idea.5) What we will
do is to compare the basic idea with our topic here. Obviously, there is an „onto-
epistemic“ level of interpretation in that movie which implies the simple state-
ment that nobody is able to determine his/her’s ontological state. Because (given
a „perfect simulation“) there is no way to give a criterion for differing between
simulation and real world (or concrete world modaliter and real world realiter).
This is nothing but the problem of substance and attribute. But using here the
computer metaphor (because we talk about actual simulation software), displays
humans as subroutines of a higher-order matrix programme to which we have no
perceptive access. As a part of a larger programme, we cannot have knowledge
of detached parts of the same programme, unless by indirect speculation. But the
latter would not eventually enable humans to gain actual insight into the matrix
programme, but would rather serve the purpose of somehow improving the in-
sight into our own programme. Which is far more modest. And it is perhaps this
sort of modesty which would serve as a reasonable basis for any future ethics
which is to be derived from the resulting relationship between sceptic and spe-
culative aspects of our present model of the world.
In fact, this perspective, to visualize the world as a permanent computational
process which is part of a larger whole, is very much compatible with what is
going on in present research: So far, there are only few publications dealing ex-
plicitly with a combination of quantum gravity and quantum computation, but a
number of important indications are already at hand. Indeed, classical physics
could be visualized as one which emerges from a choice of transport channels
processed quantum information on the fundamental level has to make. These
channels would be the vertex lines of the spin network through which informati-
on is able to percolate (like coffee in a filter).
                                                          
5 This is going back to a novel by Daniel F. Galouye’s of 1964 which has been adapted to a movie for German
television as early as 1973 by Rainer Werner Fassbinder. There is another movie by Josef Rusnak with the same
topic which is much nearer to the novel: The 13th Floor, 20th Century Fox, 1999.
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But we realize that in order to answer the open questions, only an interdsicipli-
nary and mutually heuristic cooperation of both science and philosophy can pro-
duce deeper insight into the underlying fundamental structures. So far, such a
cooperation has been publicly demanded but more often feared in practise. It is
time now to take the next step.
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